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Introduction  
This Essay strives to advance the current international movement to 
deter the transnational corrupt practices that have long burdened the 
                                                                                                                      
 *
 Professor of Law, Duke University. The theme of this Essay was presented to a 
session of the Inter-University Council Program on Public and Private Justice in Dubrovnik, 
Croatia on May 24, 2009 and to a panel of the Law & Society Association Meeting in Denver, 
Colorado on May 28, 2009. The possible relevance of the American experience to the current 
international concern was first presented at a 2007 conference at the Duke Law School. The 
corresponding paper was published as Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for 
Lincoln’s Law Abroad, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109 (2007). It was presented again at a 
Conference on the Civil Law Consequences of Corruption at the Centre for European Law and 
Politics at the University of Bremen in Germany on March 15, 2008. That preview of this 
Essay was republished in The Civil Law Consequences of Corruption 37 (Olaf Meyer 
ed., 2009). The earlier presentations did not advance the proposal presented here. But this 
Essay has benefited from helpful reactions and conversations at each of the four presentations 
to very different conferees, but especially to those attending the Bremen conference. Todd 
Miller helped as an editor and research assistant. Jennifer Behrens of the Goodson Library at 
Duke has also been a great source of help. 
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global economy and weakened governments, especially in “developing” 
nations. Laws made in the last decade to address this longstanding global 
problem have not been effectively enforced. Described here are the mod-
erately successful efforts in the United States since 1862 to reward 
private citizens serving as enforcers of laws prohibiting corrupt prac-
tices. It is suggested that this American experience might be adapted by 
international organizations to enhance enforcement of the new public 
international laws. 
I. The Transnational Corruption Problem 
The weakness of many governments caused in part by their vulner-
ability to corruption is a misfortune having serious transnational 
consequences. Given the rise of terrorism and piracy in weakly governed 
lands, and the declining physical condition of the planet we share, one 
need not be an ardent humanitarian to be concerned about the spreading 
deterioration of governments in many former imperial colonies. The 
promotion by the World Trade Organization and its antecedents of free 
trade in the global marketplace has conferred many benefits, but few of 
these have been received by the peoples of “developing countries.”1 
A root problem for many failing or weak states is that they are dis-
served by officials seeking personal kickbacks on anything that can be 
bought from or sold by their government, including mineral leases, med-
ical supplies, textbooks, building construction, roads, railways, tourism 
concessions, new airports, agricultural equipment, or even imaginary 
enterprises and activities.2 And the corrupt ruling elites who receive these 
bribes often protect themselves by investing their proceeds overseas, not 
at home, thus contributing yet further to the attrition of the economy of 
the peoples they purport to serve.3 
The problem of corruption may be especially grave in nations en-
dowed with natural resources highly valued by people in wealthier 
nations.4 Americans in 2010 know from current experience that firms 
extracting minerals are sometimes careless about the natural environ-
                                                                                                                      
 1. See generally Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal 
System (1987); Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (Chantal Thomas & 
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).  
 2. Robert I. Rotberg, The Challenge of Weak, Failing, and Collapsed States, in Leash-
ing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World 83, 87 (Chester A. 
Crocker et al. eds., 2007). 
 3. Id. at 86. 
 4. See generally Leslie Holmes, Rotten States?: Corruption, Post-Communism 
and Neoliberalism (2006); International Handbook on the Economics of Corrup-
tion (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006). 
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mental consequences of their extractions,5 perhaps especially when min-
ing or drilling in nations distant from their own, but the concern of ruling 
elites about those consequences is in many nations likely to be quite lim-
ited and reconciled by the personal rewards they receive as controllers of 
governments unable to deter either the corruption or environmental reck-
lessness practiced by foreign firms. The World Bank calculated that 
bribes totaling a trillion dollars were paid in 2002.6 A large share of that 
amount was undoubtedly paid to officials of weak governments by firms 
that extract and export natural resources for sale in the developed world. 
And much of the foreign aid to such nations provided by the World Bank 
or the International Monetary Fund seems quite likely to end up in some 
officials’ secret bank accounts. It is reasonable to suppose that the cor-
ruption of higher officials sets a low moral standard disabling effective 
government at the prosaic levels of law enforcement in “developing” 
nations.7 Unless and until means can be devised to deter bribery in fail-
ing and failed nations, globalization can be of scant benefit to “the 
bottom billion”8 identified by Professor Collier, who are destined to be 
governed weakly, if at all. Their ungoverned states will continue to ex-
port poverty and serve as havens for all sorts of gangsters, pirates, and 
terrorists. 
II. The American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
A. The Limits of Its Public Enforcement 
This problem of transnational corruption was first recognized as a 
matter for international concern in the United States during the Cold 
War.9 American firms had long been free to bribe foreign officials in vio-
lation of the foreign country’s laws to induce those officials to invest 
public funds in American goods or services or to supply access to local 
resources. It was fair to assume that such payments were sometimes 
                                                                                                                      
 5. For an account of recent events in the Gulf of Mexico, see Liz Judge, Another Oil 
Explosion in the Gulf: Enough is Enough, unearthed (Sept. 2, 2010, 2:32 PM), http:// 
unearthed.earthjustice.org/blog/2010-september/another-oil-explosion-gulf-enough-enough; 
see generally Earle A. Ripley et al., Environmental Effects of Mining (1996). 
 6. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in Global Crises, Global 
Solutions 301, 301 (Bjørn Lomborg ed., 2004). 
 7. A contemporary reflection on the relationship of law enforcement to basic human 
conditions is Gary Haugen & Victor Boutros, And Justice for All: Enforcing Human Rights for 
the World’s Poor, Foreign Aff., May–June 2010, at 51, 52. 
 8. The phrase belongs to Paul Collier. See, e.g., The Bottom Billion: Why the 
Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (2007). 
 9. Donald R. Cruver, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A 
Guide for U.S. Firms Doing Business in the International Marketplace vii, 1–12 (2d 
ed. 1999). 
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indispensable conditions of foreign trade by the American firms because 
contracts were often given to the highest bidder, i.e. the firm offering the 
biggest bribe.10 In the United States, bribes paid to foreign officials were 
long regarded as expenses deductible against income for income tax 
purposes, regardless of their illegality under foreign law,11 and thus were 
in a special sense subsidized by the government.  
The Watergate scandal and the misuse of corporate money to fund 
President Nixon’s 1972 presidential campaign led to an investigation by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of reported expenses 
that might have been payments made to gain an illicit advantage with 
foreign government officials. The investigation coincidentally revealed 
widespread use of false accounting methods to conceal bribes paid to 
foreign officials.12 The SEC initiated the practice of investigating such 
reporting and seeking injunctions to compel companies to make full dis-
closures in the financial statements they distributed to investors.13 The 
SEC also initiated a voluntary disclosure program that led to the revela-
tion that more than 450 companies had concealed at least $400 million 
(at least $4 billion in 2010 dollars) in bribes paid to foreign officials in 
one year.14 Among the scandals revealed was the payment of $1 million 
(at least $10 million by 2010 standards) by the Lockheed Aircraft Corpo-
ration to Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands to secure the sale of a 
military aircraft.15 
The domestic political reaction to these scandals led to enactment of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) that modified the Securities 
Exchange Act to require transparent accounting for payments to foreign 
officials by all firms listing their securities on American exchanges.16 
Thus, all firms, American or foreign, in which Americans were likely to 
invest were made subject to punishment for concealing illegal payments, 
                                                                                                                      
 10. For reflections on the problem, see W. Michael Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, 
Crusades and Reforms 151–173 (1979). 
 11. The U.S. Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1958 to eliminate the deductabil-
ity of bribes paid to foreign officials. Pub. L. No. 85–866, 72 Stat. 1606, 1608. That provision 
is now codified as 26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1).  
 12. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n [SEC], 94th Cong., Report of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and 
Practices submitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
13 (1976). 
 13. E.g., SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829–30 (E.D. Wis. 
1978). 
 14. See Mark Pieth, Introduction, in The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Com-
mentary 7 n.11 (Mark Pieth et al. eds., 1997). 
 15. Obituary: Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, BBC News (Dec. 2, 2004, 8:17 
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/749465.stm. Also bribed by Lockheed were officers 
of the Japanese government. See Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics 163 
(1988). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006). 
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or offers of payment, to officers of foreign governments as well as those 
paid in the United States. It was presumed that shareholders would dis-
approve and prohibit payments such as that made to Prince Bernhard. 
Because the SEC had authority only over firms required to file pub-
lic accounting statements that might be read by American investors, and 
had no authority over competing American firms that were privately 
owned, a criminal law to be enforced by the Department of Justice was 
also enacted.17 The new law was adopted by a unanimous vote in both 
Houses of Congress and signed by President Carter in 1977.18 The crimi-
nal law prohibits “corruptly in furtherance of an offer, [any] payment, 
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, 
gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value” 
directly or indirectly to a foreign official for the purpose of influencing 
an official decision of financial consequence to the donor.19 These prohi-
bitions were thus imposed on all American domestic concerns whether 
or not they were registered on a stock exchange, so long as any part of 
the transaction occurred in the United States (or in its territorial waters), 
in interstate commerce, or by use of the United States mail.20 The regu-
lated firms are generally accountable for the corrupt conduct of their 
employees.21 But the prohibitions of this 1977 law did not apply to for-
eign nationals acting on behalf of foreign subsidiaries of American firms 
if their misconduct occurred outside the United States.22 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) gave a salute to the 
1977 American law when, a year later, it promulgated its Rules of Con-
duct to Combat Extortion and Bribery.23 The leadership of the Chamber 
recognized that bribes paid as a cost of competing in international trans-
actions do nothing for the collective profits of its members or for the 
quality of the goods or services they purchase or provide. Unsurpris-
ingly, these ICC rules of business ethics were declared to be “ineffective 
                                                                                                                      
 17. For a chronicle of the legislative history, see Cruver, supra note 9, at 1–12. 
 18. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1 (2006) (first enacted on 
Dec. 19, 1977, 91 Stat. 1495).  
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2 (2006). See generally Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act and the New International Norms 7–20 (2005). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(a), 78dd–2(a) (2006). 
 21. To some it seems unjust that innocent shareholders should bear a resulting loss 
caused by the criminal misconduct of their employees. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul 
to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Pun-
ishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 387 n.4 (1981). 
 22. Deming, supra note 19, at 8. 
 23. The Rules were amended in 1996 and again in 2005. On their current content, see 
Int’l Chamber of Com. [ICC], Doc. No. 194/51, Major Changes Brought by the 2005 
Revision of the ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations to Combat Extortion 
and Bribery (2005), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/ 
anticorruption/Statements/revised ICC Rules.pdf. 
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as a practical matter,”24 but they were a first international acknowledg-
ment of the radiating adverse global consequences of corrupt 
governments disserving weak states. 
The FCPA was written only as public law to be enforced by the SEC 
and the Department of Justice. No provision was made for enforcement 
in civil actions brought by private plaintiffs.25 Until recently, the number 
of enforcement prosecutions was never large.26 The Department of Jus-
tice was mindful of the adverse consequences of effective enforcement; 
it recognized that American investors were rewarded and American 
workers found jobs as a result of deals with foreign governments whose 
officers often expected to share the bribers’ wealth even if it might im-
pose a cost on the people they were purporting to serve and on the 
efficiency of the global marketplace. 
But the FCPA had an additional legal consequence. A violation re-
sulting in harm to competing firms exposes the offender to civil liability 
under the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO).27 And unlawful commercial bribery is also a violation of the tort 
law of most states if it causes foreseeable harm to a business competitor 
or others.28 As Judge Richard Posner opined: “Commercial bribery is a 
deliberate tort, and one way to deter it is to make it worthless to the tort-
feasor by stripping away all his gain.”29 Indeed, it is the sort of deliberate 
tort that may expose the wrongdoer to liability for punitive damages, 
imposed in the courts of almost any state in the common law tradition.30 
As with criminal prosecutions, private claims in American courts for 
damages allegedly resulting from violations of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
                                                                                                                      
 24. Cruver, supra note 9, at 81. 
 25. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027–30 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 26. Deming, supra note 19, at 6. For an example of weak enforcement, see Mark Le-
vin, Lighting Up the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Case Study of U.S. Tobacco Industry 
Political Influence Buying in Japan, 34 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 471 (2009), discussing 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company’s affairs in Japan. 
 27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006). Cf W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Techtronics 
Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (holding that the Act of State doctrine does not bar private 
claims). See also Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Société Nationale des Pétroles du Congo, No. 05 
Civ. 5101(LAP), 2006 WL 846351 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (denying defendants’ motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 
claim). 
 28. See, e.g., Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 958 (2003). 
 29. Williams Elec. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2004). But cf. 
Kevin E. Davis, Civil Remedies for Corruption in Government Contracting: Zero Tolerance 
Versus Proportional Liability (Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2009/4, 2009), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/130 (advocating a proportional liability approach, 
rather than a zero-tolerance approach, to deal with bribery). 
 30. For a full account of this tradition, see Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages 
(5th ed. 2005). See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Historical Fiction: Punitive Dam-
ages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9618, 1996). 
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tices Act have been few. Yet the prospect of civil liability imposed by 
private firms who lose business to a corrupting competitor,31 or perhaps 
even by a defrauded government, may have enhanced the deterrent effect 
of criminal law.  
A recent example of such a civil action brought by a foreign gov-
ernment in an American court is that brought in 2009 by the Republic of 
Iraq in federal court in New York against ninety three defendants alleged 
to have participated in frauds associated with the United Nations oil-for-
food program. It is reported that Iraq seeks $10 billion as compensation 
for what it describes as “the largest financial fraud in human history.”32 
The claim seems plausible. Its attorneys may be serving for fees contin-
gent on success. Representing a civil plaintiff, they will have access to 
discovery. Iraq bears little risk of being required to reimburse the defen-
dants should its lawyers fail to prove its case. And the defendants’ assets 
may be found in the United States and seized if necessary to collect a 
money judgment favoring Iraq. 
Public enforcement of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act has improved in the 21st century. Enlargement of the role of the SEC 
was initiated by the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995.33 That law 
imposed a duty on auditors to detect and disclose corrupt practices.34 The 
auditor is no longer permitted to rely on personal confidence in the in-
tegrity of the audited firm, but must investigate the integrity of the firm’s 
reporting of payments made.35 In addition, the SEC has commenced the 
practice of requiring firms listed on American exchanges to disgorge 
profits proven to be derived from corrupt deals.36 
                                                                                                                      
 31. See, e.g., Korea Supply, 63 P.3d 937; Williams Elec. Games, 366 F.3d 569. 
 32. Iraq’s Legacy Lawsuit, The FCPA Blog (May 6, 2009, 8:38 PM), http:// 
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/5/7/iraqs-lawsuit-legacy.html.  
 33. Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (2006)).  
 34. See id. § 301 (adding Section 10A Audit Requirements to the Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78a). 
 35. See generally Deming, supra note 19, at 373–78 (discussing the duties of auditors). 
 36. See SEC, SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Sei-
mens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery with Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of 
Over $1.6 Billion, Litigation Release No. 20829 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm (announcing that Siemens agreed to pay 
$350 million in disgorgement); SEC, SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery; Charges 
Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc. with Related Accounting Violations—Companies to Pay Dis-
gorgement of $177 Million; KBR Subsidiary to Pay Criminal Fines of $402 Million; Total 
Payments to be $579 Million, Litigation Release No. 20897A (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm (announcing that Halliburton and 
KBR agreed to pay $177 million in disgorgement). See also David C. Weiss, Note, The For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International 
Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
471, 482–88 (2009) (discussing the SEC’s increased efforts to disgorge). For a brief summary 
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The Department of Justice then also substantially enlarged its efforts 
to enforce corrupt practices law.37 Those efforts seem to have abundantly 
reimbursed the national treasury. It is reported that American businesses 
creating joint ventures with Chinese companies or acquiring Chinese 
outfits are especially exposed to the risk of prosecution because of the 
probability that their ventures are corrupt.38 And now, for the first time, 
the Department of Justice has begun to prosecute individual officers of 
firms who participate in the briberies and, along with the SEC, to require 
their employers to disgorge profits from deals acquired by their crimes. 
Among those successfully prosecuted is a member of Congress who is 
alleged to have negotiated a corrupt deal with Nigeria on behalf of an 
American firm.39 
Two of the cases advanced by the SEC and the Department of Jus-
tice warrant special note. One is the case against the Halliburton 
Company that disgorged $559 million in 2009 as punishment for its cor-
rupt practices in Nigeria.40 Albert Jack Stanley, who managed the 
Halliburton subsidiary under the supervision of Richard Cheney, then the 
Halliburton CEO,41 faced an extended sentence for his firm’s bribery of 
public officers in Nigeria and bargained for a reduced sentence by be-
                                                                                                                      
of the accounting standards imposed by the SEC, see Deming, supra note 19, at 21–27, 373–
84. 
 37. See Carrie Johnson, U.S. Targets Bribery Overseas; Globalization, Reforms Give 
Rise to Spike in Prosecutions, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 2007, at D1. They may be more willing to 
enforce criminal laws prohibiting money laundering, wire and mail fraud, and conspiracy laws 
in the context of bribery allegations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Twenty-Two 
Executives and Employees of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in 
Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2010/January/10-crm-048.html; Ashby Jones, Another Individual Falls in DOJ’s FCPA Ramp-
Up, Wall St. J. Blog (Feb. 11, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/11/ 
another-individual-falls-in-dojs-fcpa-ramp-up/; George J. Terwilliger, Corrupt Payments 
Abroad: FCPA and Other Risks, Nat’l L.J., June 2, 2008, at 12. 
 38. Sheri Qualters, Risk of Bribe Probes Grows for Business, Nat’l L.J., Jan. 9, 2008, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1199786732205. 
 39. David Stout, Ex-Louisiana Congressman Sentenced to 13 Years, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
14, 2009, at A14 (Congressman Jefferson was convicted and sentenced to thirteen years in 
prison. The prosecutor had sought a sentence of twenty-seven years.). See also Marcia Coyle, 
Jefferson Case Shows SEC, DOJ Targeting Individuals: Foreign Corrupt Act Case Reflects a 
Trend, Nat’l L.J., June 11, 2007, at 6.  
 40. The company paid $382 million to the Department of Justice and $177 million to 
the SEC. Press Release, Halliburton Company, Halliburton Announces Settlement of Depart-
ment of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Investigations (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/ 
press_release/2009/corpnws_021109.html.  
 41. Stanley was designated by Cheney to be president of the Halliburton subsidiary 
Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) in 1998. The bribes to Nigerian officials had commenced in 
1995 and continued until 2004, when Stanley was fired. See Russell Gold, Halliburton Ex-
Official Pleads Guilty in Bribe Case, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 2008, at A1. 
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coming a witness against his firm.42 Halliburton, long centered in Hous-
ton, moved its corporate headquarters to Dubai in 2008, apparently in the 
hope of reducing its exposure to federal law enforcement.43 Its continu-
ing relationships in Iraq are not presently the subject of criminal 
proceedings, but they are appropriate subjects of continuing investiga-
tions.44 
Also to be noted is the prosecution of the German firm, Siemens, 
whose registration with the SEC exposed it to federal prosecutions for 
bribes paid to the Nigerian government, resulting in a $1.6 billion fine 
paid by Siemens to the United States for corrupt practices in numerous 
nations.45 That prosecution came on the heels of a German prosecution.46 
And the Department of Justice in January 2009, for the first time initi-
ated a proceeding to recover funds received as a bribe paid by Siemens 
to the son of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and held in a bank ac-
count in Singapore. This appears to be the Department’s first effort to 
retrieve a bribe paid to a foreign official.47 The event seems perhaps to 
have alerted the Liberian government to the possible use of American aid 
in tracking its officials who have benefited from corruption in that na-
tion.48 
But still there are constraints on enforcement of such laws by public 
officials. Because of their adverse domestic economic consequences, such 
federal prosecutions can be politically very difficult for the prosecutors in 
the United States Department of Justice. For example, James Giffen, an 
American citizen, was indicted in 2003 for bribing President Nursultan 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Laolu Akande, Halliburton’s Ex–Chief Ready to Testify in Nigeria, Guardian (Ni-
geria), Apr. 14, 2009. Sentencing of Stanley has repeatedly been postponed. Sentencing 
Report for Q2 ’10, FCPA Blog (July 1, 2010, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/ 
2010/7/1/enforcement-report-for-q2-10.html. 
 43. See Charlie Cray, Halliburton Takes the Money and Runs Away, Huffington Post 
(Mar. 13, 2007, 11:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlie-cray/halliburton-takes-the-
mon_b_43304.html. 
 44. See Jim Donahue, Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers, HalliburtonWatch (Oct. 
10, 2006), http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/iraqforsale.html; Pratap Chaterjee, Is Halli-
burton Forgiven and Forgotten? Or How to Stay Out of Sight While Profiting From the War in 
Iraq, CorpWatch (June 3, 2009), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15372. 
 45. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Seimens AG for Engaging in 
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
294.htm. 
 46. See Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, Where Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 21, 2008, at B1. 
 47. Chasing Dirty Money, The FCPA Blog (Jan. 11, 2009, 6:28 PM), http:// 
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/11/chasing-dirty-money.html. See also Press Release, Dep’t 
of Justice, Department of Justice Seeks to Recover Approximately $3 Million in Illegal Pro-
ceeds from Foreign Bribe Payments (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2009/January/09-crm-020.html. 
 48. Liberia’s Graft-Busting Leader, The FCPA Blog (June 9, 2009, 8:48 PM), http:// 
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/6/10/liberias-graft-busting-leader.html. 
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Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan on behalf of Mobil, Texaco, Phillips/Conoco, 
and BP. His alleged offense gained public attention in 2000.49 After four 
years of investigation, Giffen was charged with thirteen counts of violating 
the FCPA and thirty-six counts of criminal money laundering.50 President 
Nazarbaev, who has been a friend of American foreign policy in the Mid-
dle East, was critical of the prosecution, perhaps sensing that he could 
even lose his office as a result of it.51 Prospective government witnesses 
were even said to have received death threats.52 In his defense, Giffen al-
leged that he had been regularly debriefed by United States government 
officials, and claimed that “by the time of the transactions at the heart of 
the indictment, [he] understood himself to be working not only for the 
government of Kazakhstan, but also for . . . United States government 
agencies.”53 The Justice Department moved to preclude the defendant from 
advancing the defense that he was acting on public authority, or to use in-
formation classified as secret by the government agencies said to be 
involved. The trial court denied the motion to preclude the defense, but did 
not rule on the motion regarding government secrets. On appeal by the 
prosecution, the court of appeals, after nearly a year of deliberation, dis-
missed the appeal on the ground that the trial court order to be reviewed 
lacked the finality essential to appellate jurisdiction.54 The trial has been 
repeatedly postponed. It will perhaps be held some day,55 but maybe 
                                                                                                                      
 49. For a full account, see Steve LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of 
Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (2007). See also Robert Baer, See No Evil: 
The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism 241–42 (2002). 
 50. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, American Businessman Charged with $78 
Million in Unlawful Payments to Kazakh Officials in 6 Oil Transactions; Former Mobil Corp. 
Executive Indicted for Tax Evasion in Kickback Scheme (Apr. 2, 2003), available at 
www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April03/giffenwilliams.pdf.  
 51. Marlena Telvick, United States vs. James H. Giffen, Int’l Freedom Network 
(May 20, 2004), http://ifn.org.uk/article.php?sid=2. The indictment also alleged that Swiss 
authorities had begun “investigating accounts ‘nominally owned by offshore companies but 
beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, by Balgimbayev and Nazarbayev . . . into which Mr. 
Giffen had made tens of millions of dollars in unlawful payments’ in 1999.” Id. 
 52. Peter Crisell, Kazakhstan: A Khanate Revived, newnations.com, http:// 
www.newnations.com/specialreports/kazakhstan.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
 53. United States v. Giffen, 473 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 54. Id. at 37. 
 55. Steve Levine, James Giffen’s First Line of Defense Appears to Fall, The Oil and 
the Glory (May 2, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/blogs/russia_oil_politics/ 
archives/2009/05/james_giffens_f.html/. Meanwhile, another American, Mark Seidenfeld 
has been accused of corrupt practices in Kazakhstan on behalf of a different client. 
His investigation was dropped in 2007, but then reopened. A sympathetic assessment of the 
latter case is Following Acquittal, New False Charges Are Pending Against 
Mark Seidenfeld, HelpMark Seidenfeld and Boycott Ducat (Aug. 29, 2007, 3:06 
PM), http://savemark.wordpress.com/2007/08/29/following-acquittal-new-false-charges-are- 
pending-against-mark-seidenfeld/.  
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Kazakhstan is too important to the United States for the Department of 
Justice to continue the case.56 
The Giffen case, although extraordinary,57 illustrates a fundamental 
difficulty with the public enforcement of any law forbidding bribery of 
foreign officials. The responsible public officers so engaged are required 
to punish their fellow citizens, with whom they may have diverse con-
nections and shared interests, and to whom they owe their official status, 
in order to protect a distant government with whom they have no con-
nection. 
III. The Internationalization of Laws 
Deterring Corruption 
In the last decade of the 20th century, other nations, in conformity 
with the encouragement of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
began to align themselves with the 1977 American policy of imposing 
criminal punishment on their citizens who bribe officers of foreign gov-
ernments.58 The international campaign had its origins in the Asian 
financial crisis of the 1990s. That event elevated interest in international 
regulation of trade to provide greater stability in developing economies. 
The United States was especially interested in persuading other nations 
to join in deterring transnational bribery in order to level the playing 
field for American firms constrained by its FCPA from offering the best 
bribes to the foreign officials seeking them. As a result of its urging and 
the concerns heightened by the crisis, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1997 promulgated a new in-
ternational Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.59 
This OECD Convention obligates signatory nations to enact criminal 
laws with a “functional equivalence” to those it prescribes, and to 
                                                                                                                      
 56. James Giffen and America’s Secrets, The FCPA Blog (July 15, 2009, 8:12 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/7/15/james-giffen-and-americas-secrets.html.  
 57. For example, in a similar case, Frederic Bourke was convicted in October 2009 of 
allowing his agent in Azerbaijan to bribe officials and was denied a new trial. United States v. 
Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 58. See J. Ndumbe Anyu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Catalyst for 
Global Corruption Reform (2007); Deming, supra note 19, at 93–130. 
 59. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions art. 1.1, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1. See 
also Deming, supra note 19, at 85–100. For a brief account, see Lucinda A. Low & William 
M. McGlone, Avoiding Problems Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. Antiboycott 
Laws, OFAC Sanctions, Export Controls, and the Economic Espionage Act, in Negotiating 
and Structuring International Commercial Transactions 200–03 (Mark R. Sand-
strom & David N. Goldsweig eds., 2003). 
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cooperate with the enforcement efforts of other signatory nations.60 In 
support of the latter obligation, a system of private peer review was 
established that subjects signatory nations to periodic reviews by teams 
of specialists from at least two other states.61 One substantive difference 
between the OECD Convention and the FCPA is that the Convention 
does not forbid campaign contributions to foreign candidates for public 
office, as the FCPA does.62 And the Convention is silent on any 
obligation of signatory nations to enact accounting and record-keeping 
standards corresponding to those enforced in the United States by its 
Securities Exchange Commission.63 
The 1997 OECD Convention marked the beginning of an interna-
tional movement based on the premise that we all have a stake in the 
integrity of the global marketplace that deserves the protection of law.64 
Much energy and rhetoric is now being expended around the globe in 
campaigns to protest and deter transnational corrupt practices. The cam-
paign may be heard in such venues as the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the International Bar Association, and non-governmental 
institutions such as Transparency International and Global Witness that 
are devoted to resisting transnational corruption of governments and 
courts. German observers have also expressed support because of con-
cerns that German firms engaged in corruption abroad may have brought 
the practices home, i.e., that “globalization has become a motor for cor-
ruption in Germany.”65 
In response to the OECD Convention, the American FCPA was 
amended again in 1998 as the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Com-
petition Act66 in order to bring American law into accord with the 
                                                                                                                      
 60. See OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ¶ 2 (1997), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf. 
 61. Peer review is said to be “at the heart of the ‘trade’ of the OECD.” Fabrizio Pagani, 
Peer Review: A Tool For Co-Operation and Change, An Analysis of an OECD Working Me-
thod, OECD SG/LEG(2002)1 (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/33/16/ 1955285.pdf. 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1 (2006). 
 63. The OECD Convention is silent on accounting practices. See Weiss, supra note 36, 
at 478–80; cf. supra note 34. 
 64. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, supra note 59, Preamble. See generally Deming, supra note 19, at 93–
130. 
 65. So we are told by a German prosecutor. Carter Dougherty, Germany Battling Rising 
Tide of Corporate Corruption, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2007, at C1. 
 66. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd, et seq. (2006)). On the state of the 
law at that time, see Symposium, Review of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on Its Twentieth 
Anniversary: Its Application, Defense and International Aftermath, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 
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Convention.67 One substantive change made for this purpose was legiti-
mize “grease” payments, i.e. small rewards or tips paid to lower-ranking 
officers “to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine govern-
mental action.”68 In some weak states, such “grease” payments may 
indeed be important to the operation of impoverished governments.69 
Another reform was an extension of the law to criminalize bribes paid to 
officials of “public international organizations.”70 And foreign nationals 
working for American firms were brought within the group subject to 
criminal liability for illicit payments or offers of payment. But those 
working for foreign subsidiaries were still not included, leaving open a 
means of evasion of federal law that surely remains in use. 
While the United States was thus strengthening its efforts to address 
the global problem, thirty-six nations had ratified the OECD Convention 
within a decade.71 These included the governments of most of the major 
players in international commerce, except China. Also, in 1997, the Or-
ganization of American States promulgated the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption,72 which is even more explicit in requir-
ing ratifying states to enact specified criminal laws. In 2002, the Council 
of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption entered into force, 
with forty-six signatories.73 In 2003, the African Union opened for signa-
ture its similar convention.74 In 2006, the European Union adopted a 
resolution calling for the return of assets of illicit origin to nations vic-
timized by corrupt practices.75 
                                                                                                                      
263 (1998); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229 (1997). 
 67. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, supra note 59.  
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2(b) (2006). See, e.g., How to Grease a Palm; Bribery, Econo-
mist, Dec. 23, 2006, at 115 (noting that tactful strategies are used to ensure that bribes go 
undetected). 
 69. See generally J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 417 (1967) (suggesting that the rewards of corrupt practices 
may sometimes serve the public interest by motivating some officials). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2 (2006). 
 71. See Public Procurement: Spotting the Bribe, OECD Observer Mar. 2007, at 11, 
12. 
 72. Deming, supra note 19, at 101–04. 
 73. Id. at 105. 
 74. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 
43 I.L.M. 5 (2004). 
 75. See Second Comm. of the Gen. Assembly, Draft Resolution, Preventing and Com-
bating Corrupt Practices and Transfer of Assets of Illicit Origin and Returning Such Assets, In 
Particular to the Countries of Origin, Consistent with the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/61/L.53 (Dec. 1, 2006) (submitted by Aboubacar Sadikh Barry). 
See also EU Explanation of Position—Preventing and Combating Corrupt Practices and 
Transfer of Assets of Illicit Origin, Consistent with the UN Convention on Corruption (Dec. 6, 
2006), available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6571_en.htm.  
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Also in 2003, the United Nations opened its Convention Against 
Corruption76 negotiated in Vienna by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 
It has been ratified by over one hundred nations and is also now in 
force.77 Its general tone is reflected in Article 19: 
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal of-
fence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or 
position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, 
in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or 
her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage 
for himself or herself or for another person or entity. 
A similarly tentative tone is expressed in the UN Convention’s sug-
gestions that each State Party take action to proscribe deliberate 
concealment of bribes78 or obstruction of justice,79 and provide for civil 
liability “as may be necessary.”80 It was said that this UN Convention, 
while diffident, would be a “focal point” of the United States’ campaign 
against corruption.81 
IV. Problems with Public Enforcement of the 
New International Conventions 
One may admire the sincere efforts of all those who have secured the 
promulgation and ratification of these international conventions and still 
question whether they are effective in deterring corruption of public offi-
cials, or perhaps merely express “a hollow commitment.”82 A thorough 
empirical study revealing an effect on the realities of weak governments 
                                                                                                                      
 76. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 
31, 2003); Deming, supra note 19, at 114–23. 
 77. Press Release, U.N. Info. Serv., United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
Receives 100th Ratification (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/ 
pressrels/2007/uniscp548.html.  
 78. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 76, art. 24. 
 79. Id. art. 25. 
 80. Id. art. 26. 
 81. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau for Int’l Narcotics & Crime Control, U.S. 
Contributes $500,000 to Support Implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Corruption 
(Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/other/39714.htm.  
 82. Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Transparency Int’l, Progress Report 2009: 
Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions 9 (2009), available at http:// 
www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/oecd_pr_2009. 
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has not been conducted, but the available data points to a conclusion that 
“enforcement must be re-energized.”83 
The impediments to enforcement by public officers are obvious and 
notably illustrated in the Kazakhstan case in the United States. Are pub-
lic prosecutors in the nations signing a convention likely to be vigorous 
in prosecuting their fellow nationals or local firms that employ many of 
their fellow nationals? For paying a bribe to a foreign official in order to 
secure a contract or other benefit that will indirectly serve the interests of 
their fellow nationals and their own national economies? How much ef-
fort can national prosecutors reasonably be expected to expend 
investigating possible violations of such international criminal laws? Vi-
gorous prosecutors risk being seen by fellow citizens as ungrateful and 
unpatriotic. And how much money will parliaments and legislatures fac-
ing competing demands on public resources vote to appropriate to fund 
such investigations and prosecutions? Can the system of peer review es-
tablished by the OECD secure adequate answers to these questions? And 
when impoverished nations invest the needed resources and moral com-
mitment to accuse and convict their officials and the foreign nationals 
who bribed them, can they expect that OECD nations in which the con-
victed foreigners have come to reside will assist in imposing 
punishments on their own countrymen? Corruption is easily denied, and 
exposure generally requires serious investigative effort requiring energy 
and public resources. There are inevitably present in all such matters 
competing needs for attention and the usual risk that the resources, if 
applied elsewhere, might better serve the public good.84 
The weakness of the global resolve to punish foreign corrupt prac-
tices through criminal laws enforced by public servants has been on 
display in numerous places. For example, despite the disincentives, 
prosecutors in Lesotho, at the urging of the World Bank, sought in 2000 
to punish Canadian, French, and Italian nationals and their firms for cor-
rupt practices related to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.85 As a 
result of the prosecutors’ efforts, the World Bank debarred one firm from 
                                                                                                                      
 83. Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Transparency Int’l, Progress Report 2008: 
Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions 8 (2008), available at http:// 
www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/4th_oecd_progress_report.  
 84. See, e.g., In Denial: Corruption in Romania, Economist, July 5, 2008, at 62 (re-
porting the impediments to and costs of enforcement in Romania). 
 85. See Nicol Degli Innocenti, Lesotho Highlands Bribes Trial Starts, Int’l Rivers 
(June 5, 2000), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/lesotho-water-project/lesotho-
highlands-bribes-trial-starts. For a general account of the project see Korinna Horta, The 
Mountain Kingdom’s White Oil: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, 25 Ecologist 227 
(1995).  
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further participation in projects funded by it.86 And convictions in Lesotho 
resulted in penalties imposed on some subsidiary corporations, but the 
convicted foreigners apparently remain at large. The European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF) did supply some data on the parent corporate defendants, 
but other help to Lesotho was not forthcoming.87 Such events are obvi-
ously discouraging to prosecutors in developing nations who need to 
consider competing needs for their scarce professional resources. 
In 2004, the United Kingdom, having recently enacted its criminal 
law as required by the OECD Convention, initiated an inquiry into bribes 
allegedly paid by BAE Systems, the British weapons firm, to secure con-
tracts with the government of Saudi Arabia. In November 2006, it was 
reported that Saudi Arabia, perhaps inspired by the Kazakhstan experi-
ence in the United States, threatened to break diplomatic relations with 
the United Kingdom if the investigation was not dropped.88 The next 
month, the investigation was dropped after the British government de-
termined that “ ‘the wider public interest’ ‘outweighed the need to 
maintain the rule of law.’ ”89 The action was defended by those calling 
attention to the need to secure the help of Saudi Arabia in dealing with 
Palestinian affairs and to secure thousands of jobs of workers hired to 
perform the corrupt contract,90 considerations said to overbalance the 
rule of law. Mr. Blair’s successors were told by the High Court of Justice 
in 2008 to reconsider his decision to discontinue the investigation,91 but 
on appeal the House of Lords affirmed the Prime Minister’s action in 
calling off the prosecution.92 A “summit” conference was held in London 
                                                                                                                      
 86. See World Bank Debars Acres International Limited (Acres), Int’l Rivers (June 
23, 2004), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/lesotho-water-project/world-bank-
debars-acres-international-limited-acres. 
 87. Fiona Darroch, Lesotho Highlands Water Project: Corporate Pressure on the Pros-
ecution and Judiciary, in Transparency Int’l, Global Corruption Report 2007: 
Corruption in Judicial Systems 87, 90 (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007). 
 88. David Leppard, Blair Hit By Saudi ‘Bribery’ Threat, Sunday Times (London), 
Nov. 19, 2006, at 1. 
 89. David Leigh & Rob Evans, ‘National Interest’ Halts Arms Corruption Inquiry, 
Guardian, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/dec/15/saudiarabia.armstrade. 
 90. See Barefaced, Economist, Dec. 23, 2006, at 18; but see Alan Cowell, British Con-
tractor Paid Saudi, Reports Say, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2007, at A3 (giving a later account of the 
incident); Heather Timmons & Eric Pfanner, Blair Defends Ending of Graft Inquiry; Investi-
gation of Saudi Arms Deal a National Security Risk, He Says, Int’l Herald Tribune, Dec. 
16, 2006, at 3; Kevin LaCroix, Corrupt Practices, National Security and the Rule of Law, The 
D&O Diary (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/04/articles/foreign-corrupt-
practices-act/corrupt-practices-national-security-and-the-rule-of-law/.  
 91. The case against the action was brought by an NGO, the Campaign Against Arms 
Trade. The court thanked the organization for bringing the action. See High Court Re-Opens 
Saudi Arms Corruption Investigation, Ekklesia, Apr. 24, 2008, http://ekklesia.co.uk/  
node/7051. 
 92. Christopher Hope, SFO Was Right to Call Off BAE-Saudi Corruption Probe, Law 
Lords Rule, Telegraph.co.uk, July 30, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
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in 2009 to explore the options and train business leaders to confront the 
issues.93 That conference was apparently a part of a trend of presenting 
other such “summit” conferences.94 In October 2009, the case was re-
opened by the Serious Fraud Office. In February 2010, the Office was 
able to secure an admission from BAE that it had concealed payments 
made to middlemen, resulting in a fine of roughly $50 million. But what 
made this possible was BAE’s confession of guilt under the United 
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and payment of a $400 million fine 
to the United States.95 The Serious Fraud Office has yet to demonstrate 
the will to punish the corruption of foreign officials by British firms 
seeking to gain an advantage for the Office’s fellow countrymen. 
Anti-corruption laws do have a better chance of being locally en-
forced when a new regime takes over the corrupted government in that it 
might reveal the dealings of its predecessors. This happened in Nigeria 
in 200796 and led to the investigation of Siemens by the German govern-
ment enforcing its new foreign corrupt practices law enacted pursuant to 
the international initiatives. It appeared that in 2006, Siemens’ Nigerian 
subsidiary had acquired a contract to build a power sector by paying per-
haps $21 million to Nigerian officials to close the deal.97 Exposed in 
2007, the firm not only lost a contract but also its parent firm became the 
object of criminal investigations in Germany and the United States, 
where its stock is traded and it is subject to the corresponding laws gov-
erning accounting in publicly traded firms. The German parent firm 
cooperated in the investigation and won a measure of restraint on the 
part of the prosecutors.98 It appears that it had budgeted $40 to $50 mil-
lion a year in bribes paid to Nigerian officials from 2002 to 2006.99 
                                                                                                                      
middleeast/saudiarabia/2473629/SFO-was-right-to-call-off-BAE-Saudi-corruption-probe-law-
lords-rule.html.  
 93. See Ethical Corp., The UK Anti-Corruption Summit 2009, http://www. 
ethicalcorp.com/ukethics (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). 
 94. E.g., Ethical Corp., The 3rd Annual Global Anti-Corruption Summit USA, http:// 
www.ethicalcorp.com/globalethics (last visited Aug. 30, 2010); Ethical Corp., The Future of 
Anti-Corruption Law & Enforcement in Europe, http://www.ethicalcorp.com/eulegal (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2010). 
 95. See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Allegations of Bribery, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 6, 2010, at B1. 
 96. President Umaru Yar’Adua assumed office in May 2007, promising to rid the nation 
of the squalor of corruption. A contract with Siemens Nigeria for a supply of circuit breakers 
was cancelled in December. Nigeria Suspends Siemens Dealings, BBC News (Dec. 6, 2007, 
10:40 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7130315.stm (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). 
 97. See Siemens faces Nigerian bribery inquiry, BizTech Africa (June 18, 2010, 6:00 
AM), http://www.biztechafrica.com/section/business/article/siemens-faces-neigerann-bribery-
inquiry/47/.  
 98. Schubert & Miller, supra note 46. 
 99. Id. 
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As noted, the parent firm has now paid fines of $1.6 billion to the 
governments of Germany and the United States for its corrupt practices 
in many nations. Siemens has declared its intent never to do it again. But 
will future officers of Siemens keep that promise in mind? If so, can it 
compete successfully with firms less constrained by their governments? 
Is it reasonable to expect that Siemens’ experience will suffice to deter 
other firms from other nations with less vigorous and less well-endowed 
prosecutors? A blacklisting of Siemens has been lifted and in 2008 it 
acquired new contracts with Nigeria to construct its power sector.100 
It is reported that France, like Germany, has become actively en-
gaged in anti-corruption law enforcement.101 That may be the reality 
throughout the European Union. Nevertheless, a skeptic may well doubt 
that the criminal laws pose a very serious threat to most of those firms 
around the world whose profits, indeed perhaps their economic viability, 
seem to depend on their willingness, or at least the willingness of their 
subsidiaries and their local officers, to participate in the corruption of 
foreign officials to secure markets for their goods or services. Of course, 
such criminal laws express a moral judgment, and businessmen are not 
immune to moral suasion. But as Adam Smith noted as a predicate to his 
celebration of the marketplace, moral constraints lose force as they are 
applied over greater distances.102 The moral force of such international 
law is therefore chronically weak. And corrupt practices are by definition 
secret crimes that can be prevented or deterred only by vigorous investi-
gation and forceful legal sanctions that may not be forthcoming. 
In recognition of the problem of weak public enforcement of crimi-
nal laws, the Council of Europe in 1999 adopted the Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption. Its aim, as stated by the Council, is to take 
“into account the need to fight corruption and in particular provide for 
effective remedies for those whose rights and interests are affected by 
corruption.”103 Signatories are obliged to authorize civil actions for com-
pensation of firms damaged by corrupt practices.104 This Convention 
entered into force in 2003. It provides for actions for compensation to 
                                                                                                                      
 100. Nigeria: Halliburton, Like Siemens, AllAfrica.com (Apr. 21, 2009), http:// 
allafrica.com/stories/200904210245.html. See also Siemens—Unworthy Causes, Trading-
Markets.com (May 6, 2009, 7:09 AM), http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/ 
Stock%20News/2310866/.  
 101. Robert A. Goldspink et al., Morgan Lewis, Anti-Corruption Laws in Eu-
rope: A Review of 2008 (2009), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LIT_Webcast_Anti-
CorruptionLawsInEurope_21jan09.pdf.  
 102. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 136 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. 
Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759). 
 103. Civil Law Convention on Corruption art. 3, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 174, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm. 
 104. Eur. Consult. Ass., Explanatory Report to the Civil Law Convention on Corruption 
¶ 1(a)(6) (1999), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/174.htm.  
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the defrauded government, such as that of Iraq in the oil-for-food scan-
dal,105 for all damages suffered as a result of corruption.106 It also 
provides for the protection of whistle blowers,107 the acquisition of evi-
dence,108 and provisional remedies.109 In addition, it requires transparency 
in company accounts110 and strives to promote international co-operation 
and monitoring. 
With this Convention, the Council of Europe acknowledged the need 
for a civil enforcement mechanism imposing real adverse economic 
consequences on firms that bribe foreign governments. Civil liability is 
surely important to deter firms from bribing one another’s corporate offi-
cers in the private sector. The integrity of many other governments calls 
for a similar and plausible threat of civil liability. But while the Civil 
Law Convention is a significant step forward, reports of civil actions 
against offenders are few. 
Primary attention seems to be given to the possible but seldom prac-
ticed invalidation of contracts tainted by corruption as the civil sanction 
to be imposed pursuant to the Convention. Such a civil contract action 
would presumably be brought by uncorrupted officers of the corrupted 
government to secure compensation for the economic loss suffered by 
their governments as a result of the corrupt practice. To date, no effort 
appears to have been made to bring the Council of Europe into line with 
the law of the United States recognizing bribery of foreign officials by 
American firms as a tort111 subject to punitive damages112 in proceedings 
brought by competitors who lost government contracts as a result of a 
defendant’s payment of a bribe,113 or by victimized governments such as 
Iraq.114  
Thus, while the Civil Law Convention takes steps in the direction of 
civil enforcement, they seem insufficient to enlist private enforcement to 
deter European firms motivated by the marketplace to engage in corrupt 
practices, except possibly for the most blatant misdeeds.115 Notwithstand-
ing the possibilities that remain open, the enactments of the United 
                                                                                                                      
 105. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 106. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 103, art. 3.  
 107. Id. art. 9. 
 108. Id. art. 11. 
 109. Id. art. 12. 
 110. Id. art. 10. 
 111. See generally The Civil Law Consequences of Corruption (Olaf Meyer ed., 
2009). 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2001).  
 113. See, e.g., Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937 (Cal. 2003). 
 114. See supra note 33. 
 115. The United Kingdom might be an exception. See Kary Klismet, Quo Vadis, “Qui 
Tam”? The Future of Private False Claims Suits Against States After Vermont Agency of Natu-
ral Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 283, 287–88 (2001). 
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States and other nations since 1998 conforming to all these conventions 
might be regarded as a benign gesture but one of apparently quite limited 
consequence. If an act of transnational corruption should attract substan-
tial public notice, the signatory nations have empowered themselves to 
stand on the side of integrity in government by conducting a criminal 
prosecution, or, in Europe, maybe even entertaining a civil contract ac-
tion against their nationals who offend. The United States is no longer 
alone in taking that moral stand. And perhaps the enactments will serve 
to enlarge the force of moral suasion against corrupt practices. But the 
threat of adverse consequences for those engaged in transnational brib-
ery, even in the United States, is still generally remote and evadable by 
most firms. 
In response to this situation, the OECD Council in 2009 posted a 
new recommendation that member states raise taxes on their firms de-
tected to be engaged in international corrupt practices.116 They also 
directed states to increase public awareness of the criminal law, improve 
auditing practices, and limit public subsidies and licenses to those firms 
more closely observed in their compliance, and who cooperate fully with 
the OECD’s peer review system of investigation and accountability.117 
And it urged member states “to further examine . . . [the possible use] of 
civil, commercial, and administrative laws and regulations, to combat 
foreign bribery.”118 This last recommendation confirms the need for in-
ternational consideration of the American experience with private 
enforcement of public laws. Japan, anticipating the Council’s recom-
mendations, initiated a study of the options that is underway in 2010.119 
                                                                                                                      
 116. OECD, Working Group on Bribery in Int’l Bus. Transactions, Recommendation of 
the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, § III(iii) (Nov. 26, 2009), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf. 
This is as opposed to allowing a tax deduction for the cost of bribes paid, as was long the 
practice in the United States. Id. § VIII(i). 
 117. See generally id. 
 118. Id. § III(viii). 
 119. Study Panel for Preventing a Recurrence of ODA-Related Corruption, 
Towards Preventing a Recurrence of Corruption Related to Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) (2009), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/anti-corrupt/ 
prevention.pdf. See also Veronica L. Taylor, Rule-of-Law Assistance Discourse and Practice: 
Japanese Inflections, in Law in the Pursuit of Development: Principles into Prac-
tice?, 161, 161–79 (Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2010) (providing an account of the Official 
Development Assistance program).  
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V. The American Experience with Private Enforcement of 
Its Domestic Corrupt Practices Laws 
The contemporary international problem with corruption is redolent 
of American legal history beginning in the 18th century. The new na-
tion’s citizens were then quite familiar with the problem of governmental 
corruption. Benjamin Franklin in 1767 observed that “[t]here is no kind 
of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and fre-
quently fall than that of defrauding the government.”120 They sensed that 
the line of moral conduct for those in public service is not always clearly 
drawn. This is so today because to most citizens their government is a 
distant anonymity having no moral claim upon themselves. The faint line 
between a campaign contribution and a bribe is a premier modern 
American example of this lack of clarity.121 Family interests, longstand-
ing friendships, cultural or sub-cultural connections, and political 
alliances supply other sources of tolerated improprieties.122 
Mindful of corrupt practices observed in the Continental Congress 
that waged the colonies’ war for independence,123 Franklin’s contempo-
raries in the earliest years of the nation recognized the impediments to 
effective public enforcement of laws forbidding corrupt practices. Draw-
ing on longstanding English practice, they allowed private citizens who 
had the requisite fortitude to initiate lawsuits and pursue claims in the 
name of the United States against any person or firm defrauding their 
government.124 
                                                                                                                      
 120. Benjamin Franklin, “F.B.”: On Smuggling, London Chronicle, Nov. 21–24, 
1767, available at http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (follow “Vol. 14: 
1767” hyperlink; then follow “ ‘F.B.’: On Smuggling” hyperlink). See generally Historical 
Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania (1759). 
 121. See Andrew Stark, Conflict of Interest in American Public Life 152–77 
(2000); cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (holding that it is a de-
nial of due process of law for a state supreme court justice to hear a case involving a party 
who contributed three million dollars to his political campaign to secure his judicial office). 
But see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 Sup. Ct. 876 (2010) (reflecting the 
view of the Court that campaign contributions are free speech, not bribery). 
 122. For an especially powerful example, see Alan Smart & Carolyn L. Hsu, Corruption 
or Social Capital? Tact and the Performance of Guanxi in Market Socialist China, in Cor-
ruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective 167, 167 
(Monique Nuijten & Gerhard Anders eds., 2007).  
 123. For example, Samuel Chase (a future Supreme Court Justice), was dismissed from 
the Continental Congress for his illicit use of inside information to turn a profit for himself. 
See James Haw et al., Stormy Patriot: The Life of Samuel Chase 105–08 (1980). 
 124. For accounts of the early legislation and its colonial antecedents, see Linda J. Sten-
gle, Rewarding Integrity: The Struggle to Protect Decentralized Fraud Enforcement Through 
the Public Disclosure Bar of the False Claims Act, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 471, 476–81 (2008); 
Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 81 (1972). See also 
James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Whistleblower Litigation 29–61 (3d ed., 
2002).  
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In the 19th century, the English forsook this practice of private en-
forcement of public law. But it became an important tool of government 
in the United States as it remained an unsettled and contentious place not 
so unlike many of the 21st century’s “emerging nations.” During its Civil 
War in the 1860s, the nation’s Secretary of War, responsible for oversight 
of the military striving to suppress the slave states’ secession was dis-
missed by President Lincoln for paying his friends twice the market 
price for cavalry horses that turned out to be afflicted with “every disease 
horseflesh is heir to.”125 Such scandals led to the enactment in 1862 of 
the False Claims Act, then known as “Lincoln’s Law.”126 That law re-
quired the offender guilty of defrauding the government to pay double 
damages, half of which would be paid to the “relator,” i.e. the citizen 
who commenced and maintained a claim on behalf of the United States 
to secure compensation from those engaged in corrupt practices for harm 
resulting from the taking of bribes by its officers. Thereafter, numerous 
relators came forward in the name of the United States to pursue claims 
against private contractors who were proven to have sold the army rifles 
without triggers, gunpowder diluted with sand, or uniforms that could 
not endure a single rainfall.127 
Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, “Lincoln’s Law” 
was reinforced and made to impose treble damages liability on those 
engaged in corrupt practices causing harm to the federal government.128 
The 1986 law continues to assure the relator of a substantial reward if 
the defendant is shown to have defrauded the government. Indeed, it has 
been amended again in 2009 to make it still more attractive for a relator 
to “blow a whistle.”129 Brief consideration of that law as a possible model 
for international law is therefore timely. 
For several reasons, such private enforcement by citizens in civil ac-
tions is perceived to be more effective in deterring corrupt practices than 
criminal law enforcement. First, as noted, proceedings under the federal 
False Claims Act are not criminal proceedings and so proof “beyond a 
                                                                                                                      
 125. Henry Scammell, Giantkillers: The Team and the Law that Help Whis-
tle-lowers Recover America’s Stolen Billions 38 (2004).  
 126. Federal False Claims Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696–699 (codified as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2009)). 
 127. The problem of “war profiteers” persists. Bryan Terry, Note, Private Attorneys 
General v. “War Profiteers”: Applying the False Claims Act to Private Security Contractors in 
Iraq, 30 Seattle U. L. Rev. 809 (2007). 
 128. Pub. L. No. 99–562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3739(a) 
(2009)). 
 129. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617 
(to be codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733). For a brief description of the law’s 
effects, see Jesse Lee, Protecting Homeowners, Protecting the Economy, The White House 
Blog (May 20, 2009, 6:49 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Protecting-Homeowners-
Protecting-the-Economy. 
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reasonable doubt” is not required; a “preponderance of proof” will, if 
credited, suffice to support a judgment against the defendant who 
appears to have paid a bribe to an official. Second, the private citizen-
relator has, like the public prosecutor, the rights conferred on civil liti-
gants by American rules of civil procedure to compel disclosure of 
possible evidence130 and to compel non-party witnesses to supply their 
evidence as well.131 Also, much of the government’s files are exposed to 
private investigation as a result of the Freedom of Information Act en-
acted in 1966.132 Furthermore, a relator, unlike a civil plaintiff in England 
or most other nations, is ordinarily not liable for the legal expenses of 
the defense even if he and/or the government is unsuccessful in proving 
the case.133 This is because a relator having a credible claim may secure 
private legal counsel without payment, because lawyers are available to 




When a false claims case is filed by a relator in the name of the 
United States, the Department of Justice is discreetly informed and in-
vited to take control of the proceeding, but even if it does, the case 
continues as a civil action and the private relator remains a party to be 
compensated if it is successful.135 If the Department of Justice does not 
intervene, the private relator is entitled to maintain the action in the 
name of the United States and for its benefit. Such a relator, if success-
ful, is then entitled to receive at least twenty-five percent of the trebled 
damages, plus reimbursement for costs, including attorneys’ fees.136 This 
can be a very substantial reward for the citizen who comes forward as 
the relator. More than a few American relators have in recent years been 
                                                                                                                      
 130. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37. This right was conferred on all civil litigants by the rules 
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)). For a compact account of the right to discovery, see Mark 
A. Dombroff, Discovery (1986). 
 131. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. 
 132. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 133. For an account of the origins of this distinctive “American rule,” see John Leubs-
dorf, Toward A History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 9 (1984). 
 134. See generally F.B. MacKinnon, Contingent Fee for Legal Services: A Study 
of Professional Economics and Responsibilities (1964). The origins of this unusual tradi-
tion are explained in Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 
1776–1876, at 278 (1976). Greece is one country that may also allow contingent fees. Eleni 
Skordaki & Danielle Walker, Regulating and Charging for Legal Services: An 
International Comparison 56 (1994). 
 135. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2000). 
 136. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2000). 
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able to retire in wealth after revealing frauds on the government, often 
those committed by their former employers.137  
One constraint is that the relator’s claim must be based at least in 
part on his personal knowledge. A provision enacted in 1942 requires a 
relator to be an “original source” of at least some of the information on 
which the claim rests.138 But pursuant to the recent amendment of the 
Act, a relator is not denied compensation when a case commenced by 
him or her is won by the government on proof other than evidence that 
he or she brought to the court.139 The relator is also provided with rights 
protecting him or her from retaliation by an employer.140 However, the 
present law does not empower the relator to sue a corrupt officer who 
received a bribe. 
Examples of successful private actions initiated pursuant to this law 
abound. In September 2009, the United States settled a claim against the 
Pfizer corporation for its fraudulent practices in selling medicines to 
government health care programs for $2.3 billion. The primary 
whistleblower, a former officer of Pfizer, was rewarded with a fee of 
$51.5 million.141 In a similar case in April, a relator received $48.7 
million of the $325 million paid by Northrup Grumman to the United 
States to settle a corruption claim arising from a sale of a spy satellite 
program. The whistleblower had been an engineer for Northrup.142 The 
same week, Quest Diagnostics agreed to pay $302 million for selling the 
government faulty diagnostic kits.143 In January, Eli Lilly had paid $1.42 
billion for false advertising of an antipsychotic drug sold to patients 
spending public funds; nine of its former salesmen were awarded 
perhaps as much as $100 million for blowing the whistle and filing the 
claim in the name of the United States.144 
                                                                                                                      
 137.  Examples abound. See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to 
Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotions of Zyprexa, Dep’t of Justice, (Jan. 15, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html; Masto Announces $400 Million 
Nationwide Settlement with Merck, Nev. Office of the Att’y Gen. (Feb. 7, 2008), http:// 
www.drugfraudsettlement.com/news/Nevada-Media-Release.pdf; AMERIGROUP Announces 
Settlement in Largest Ever False Claims Case, Goldberg Kohn (July 22, 2008), 
http://www.goldbergkohn.com/news-firm-1096.html. 
 138. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000). 
 139. This amendment reverses the holding in Rockwell International Corp. v. United 
States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). 
 140. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000). 
 141. Bill Berkrot, Pfizer Whistleblower’s Ordeal Reaps Big Rewards, Reuters, Sept. 2, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN021592920090902.  
 142. Peter Pae, DEFENSE; Northrop, Government End Disputes, L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 
2009, at B1.  
 143. Quest to Pay $302 Million in Marketing Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2009, at B9. 
 144. Eli Lilly Agrees to Settle Zyprexa Marketing Cases, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at 
B4. The whistleblowers’ share is reported by Joe Palazzolo, Lilly Whistleblower Reprises Role 
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Over 10,000 false-claim cases have been filed in American federal 
courts since the 1986 revision of the law.145 Although historically the 
bulk of the false claims actions were directed at those who provide 
goods or services to the military, other industries have become frequent 
targets for claims. Now, as illustrated by the 2009 examples noted above, 
many of the current false-claims cases are brought against health-care 
providers accused of overpricing goods or services paid for by the Unit-
ed States Department of Health and Human Services.146 
In 2006, Congress enacted a provision to reward states that enact 
similar laws if applicable to health care providers.147 As many as thirty 
states have done so, as have the cities of New York and Chicago.148 
A non-profit organization, Taxpayers Against Fraud, provides tips, 
information, and support to a variety of relators.149 It has complained that 
the Department of Justice does not invest sufficient resources in the en-
forcement of corruption law, even failing to spend funds that have been 
appropriated specifically for that purpose. Public notice of the 2009 
cases might supply that need. But even despite this failing, the false 
claims law serves as a useful incentive to private enforcement of the law, 
and the result is that corrupt practices are subject to strong deterrence in 
the United States. Not enough, to be sure, to prevent corrupt practices 
altogether, for, as Ben Franklin affirmed, the temptations are very great, 
perhaps especially to officers of vast commercial enterprises who are 
expected to concentrate on short-term profits. 
                                                                                                                      
in AstraZeneca Case, Main Justice: Politics, Policy and Law (Apr. 27, 2010, 6:42 PM), 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/27/whistleblower-reprises-role-in-astrazeneca-case/. 
 145. Scammell, supra note 125, at 304–05. 
 146. Marcia Coyle, High Court Vets False Claims Act, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 27, 2006, at 1. 
The Department of Justice has now taken a heightened interest in frauds committed by medi-
cal doctors and health care executives. BNA, Health Care–Fraud, 76 U.S. L. Wk. 2344, 2344 
(2007). 
 147. § 6031 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 190–171, 120 Stat. 4 
(2006), amended the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396h, to insert § 1909, providing that 
the federal contribution to Medicare programs are to be increased to ten percent for states 
enacting appropriate false claims laws applicable to health care providers and added 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396(a)(68)(C), requiring states to include provisions notifying health care employees of 
their right to become whistleblowers. 
 148. See State False Claims Acts, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund: The 
False Claims Act Legal Center, http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 
2010).  
 149. See generally Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund: The False Claims 
Act Legal Center, http://www.taf.org (last visited Sept. 20, 20l0). 
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VI. The Possibility of Private Enforcement of International 
Corrupt Practices Law in National Courts 
Might the international institutions seeking to deter transnational 
corruption usefully advance the idea of enabling similar private en-
forcement of transnational corrupt practices laws in the courts of all 
nations, or at least those of the “developed nations” of the OECD? The 
nations of that organization could agree to enact versions of the Ameri-
can laws offering handsome rewards to those who, as “relators,” expose 
transnational corrupt practices of their local firms, in the hope that the 
deterrent effect of such law would be spread among firms in all the “de-
veloped” nations. Thus, citizens of a victimized state, or anyone with 
personal knowledge of the corruption, might be authorized in the name 
of the defrauded government to invoke the jurisdiction of any signatory 
state to assert corruption claims against any firms or individuals who are 
within that state’s jurisdictional reach. Such empowerment of private 
enforcement might significantly enhance the deterrent effect of the laws 
enacted pursuant to the present Conventions. 
The culture shock resulting from such an international agreement 
could be less than a reader might suppose. American false claims laws 
are not entirely unique. The United Kingdom, Korea, and the Nether-
lands, and perhaps some other nations, have laws to reward and protect 
whistleblowers who alert prosecutors to frauds on their governments.150 
India is the scene of much active enforcement of laws resembling the 
American law.151 The idea of private claimants representing the English 
monarchy has an ancient history152 and European high courts enforcing 
constitutions are no strangers to political roles.153 
                                                                                                                      
 150. Günter Heine et al., Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison of 
National and Supranational Legal Structures 81 (U.K.), 266 (Kor.), 311 (Neth.), and 
648–49 (for a comparative analysis) (2003). It is also reported that Japan has the beginnings of 
a movement to enact legislation protecting whistleblowers. Id. at 230. 
 151. There are a substantial number of lawyers in India specializing in Qui Tam False 
Claims Act cases. See Qui Tam False Claims Act Lawyers in India, http://hg.org/ 
law-firms/Qui-Tam-False-Claims-Act/India.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). The Cabinet in 
2010 approved a bill imposing fines and penalties on those punishing whistleblowers. Cabinet 
approves bill to protect whistleblowers, expressindia (Aug. 9, 2010, 8:50 PM), http:// 
www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Cabinet-approves-bill-to-protect-whistleblowers/657959/. 
This legislation appears to be a response to the murder of a whistleblower. See Richard 
Renner, Whistleblower murdered in India, Whistleblowers Protection Blog 
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2010/01/articles/legislation/international-
1/whistleblower-murdered-in-india/. 
 152. See Smith, supra note 102 (observing the ease and comfort with which humans 
observe the misfortunes of distant others). 
 153. See Karen J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power 263–86 (2009). 
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A. Possible Enforcement of International Law in US. Courts  
As the Iraq case illustrates,154 a foreign government may invoke the 
jurisdiction of an American court to invoke, in a civil action, interna-
tional corrupt practices law against firms that bribed the foreign 
government’s officials. Thus, the United States could alone simply 
amend its foreign corrupt practices law to enable a citizen of another 
nation, such as Kazakhstan, to take on the role of a relator to bring suit 
in an American court in the name of his government against those oil 
companies who have allegedly bribed his president in violation of inter-
national corrupt practices law. Such a private plaintiff might be 
empowered to recover for the government of Kazakhstan treble damages 
from oil companies that paid such a bribe, and the relator might receive a 
substantial share as a reward for useful public service.  
As noted, the plaintiff suing on behalf of his government could, in an 
American court, be represented by a lawyer serving for a fee contingent 
on success.
155
 An advantage of treating the matter as one fit for resolution 
in a civil proceeding in an American forum is that the relator or his or 
her foreign government (if it took over the case in order seriously to pur-
sue it) would not be required to prove the bribery or the resulting 
damages “beyond a reasonable doubt.” A “preponderance of proof” 
would, if credited, suffice to support a civil judgment against the defen-
dant. Furthermore, a foreign nation or its citizen-relator pursuing a 
corruption claim in the American court could make full use of the right 
to conduct discovery. Any evidence available in the United States or in 
the possession of an American citizen could be presented at trial. Foreign 
government claimants would also share the right to compel disclosure of 
possible evidence by the accused firm156 and to compel non-party wit-
nesses within reach of an American court to supply their evidence as 
well.157 Discovery of evidence from witnesses and their files in other na-
tions is available in the United States and assisted by many foreign 
governments, or at least by those committed to the Hague Convention on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.158 A de-
fendant refusing to provide documents or other evidence upon demand 
might be subjected to an adverse judgment on the merits of the dispute 
because an American court might reasonably infer that the evidence the 
defendant refuses to produce on request would prove the allegation of 
                                                                                                                      
 154. Iraq’s Legacy Lawsuit, supra note 32. 
 155. See supra notes 136–140. 
 156. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37. 
 157. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. 
 158. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force 
for the U.S. Oct. 7, 1972). 
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the adversary.159 And if either the relator or his government is unsuccess-
ful in proving the case, they would ordinarily bear no liability for the 
legal expenses of the defense. 
In one respect, this idea of invoking the jurisdiction of American 
courts is less radical than an international reader might suppose. In the 
18th century, the first Congress of the United States conferred jurisdic-
tion on its federal courts to hear claims by foreign citizens alleging 
violations of international law.160 While the history of that provision is 
dim, it seems likely that its authors were attentive to the problems of pro-
tecting foreign diplomats and assisting foreign plaintiffs seeking to 
recover their ships or cargo from pirates.161 Whatever the 18th century 
concern, the statute is, in the 21st century, used by diverse foreign plain-
tiffs invoking human rights recognized internationally.162  
A foreign government inclined to join Iraq163 in invoking the jurisdic-
tion of American courts to enforce international law prohibiting the 
bribery of its officials might also welcome the opportunity to take over 
similar privately initiated cases brought in American courts by its own 
citizens serving as relators. For the reasons stated, it might in all respects 
be less expensive and more effective for a foreign government or its citi-
zens to proceed in a civil case against a firm guilty of corrupt practices in 
an American court than to conduct civil actions in their own forum. Re-
call the pertinent observation of a judicial member of the House of Lords 
who some years ago observed that “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so 
is a litigant drawn to the United States.”164 And there is the special attrac-
tion of such private enforcement that no public official is required to take 
personal responsibility for what may be an impolitic action but which 
might enrich their nation’s treasury. 
There is no strong reason for the United States to withhold its judi-
cial services from foreign relators or foreign governments in need of an 
effective forum in which to present suits to enforce corrupt practices 
laws.165 The private lawyers retained to conduct such cases in an Ameri-
                                                                                                                      
 159. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705–09 
(1982). 
 160. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2006)) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 161. “Uppermost in the legislative mind appears to have been offenses against ambassa-
dors; . . . violations of safe conduct were probably understood to be actionable . . . and 
individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy may well have also been contem-
plated . . . .” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004). 
 162. E.g., Abdullah v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. 
 163. See Iraq’s Legacy Lawsuit, supra note 32. 
 164. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (Eng.). 
 165. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 Cornell 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010). 
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can court are exposed to substantial income tax liability by the United 
States, so that it is not unlikely that the United States would show a net 
profit on the sale of judicial services to foreigners bringing such cases to 
its courts on behalf of their governments.166 And even if the United States 
alone were to amend its law to provide for such private enforcement of 
the foreign corrupt practices act by foreign citizens striving to protect 
their own governments, the reform would not be without some deterrent 
effect.  
But, as with the original Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the deterrent 
effect of such an employment of American jurisdiction to enable foreign 
citizens to enforce international corrupt practices law would be most felt 
by firms that are subject to that jurisdiction. There would thus be a cause 
for concern for the uneven impact on business competitors. 
A second problem with simply extending the present American law 
and legal process to relators representing foreign governments is that the 
present law assures the victimized government of the opportunity to re-
lieve the relator and take over the conduct of the litigation. It would be 
unlikely, to say the least, that public lawyers employed by the govern-
ment of Kazakhstan, for example, would vigorously pursue claims 
arising from bribes allegedly paid to the president of their republic. They 
might well, if permitted, seek to exercise control to defeat the claim 
without regard to its merit. 
And a third problem with invoking the international law in the courts 
of the United States is that even if jurisdiction over the foreign defendant 
were assured, a resulting civil judgment might be enforceable only 
against assets of the defendant that could be found in the United States. 
While one might hope that foreign courts would lend a hand in enforcing 
the judgments rendered pursuant to such legislation and against firms 
that are within the “long-arm” constitutional reach of American courts, 
experience suggests that this is unlikely unless a change could be made 
in the governing transnational law to commit foreign courts to enforce 
judgments rendered in the United States. Recent experience with efforts 
at The Hague to reach agreement about the enforcement of foreign 
judgments lends scant encouragement to such a hope.167 A serious threat 
                                                                                                                      
 166. This would obviously not be true for American jurors summoned to sit on such 
cases, especially given the potential complexity of the evidence that might be presented. On 
that account, legislation authorizing foreign citizens to sue might perhaps employ the diction 
“suit in equity” to bar application of the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. See John 
E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 685–86 (8th ed. 2010). 
 167. See Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party 
Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 543, 549 (2006); 
Stephen B. Burbank, Federalism and Private International Law: Implementing the Hague 
Choice of Court Convention in the United States, 2 J. Private Intl. L. 287, 288–89 (2006); 
Jason Webb Yackee, A Matter of Good Form: The (Downsized) Hague Judgments Convention 
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to the enforcement of an American judgment in a transnational false 
claims case is a longstanding international tradition that the courts of one 
nation do not enforce the public revenue or punitive laws of another.168 
A fourth consideration is that it might be impolitic for the United 
States alone to venture forth to provide private enforcement of a global 
antibribery and fair competition act that could have no more than limited 
effect. Some Europeans, Asians, and Africans may already resent the 
pretentiousness of American courts sitting as “world courts” as they are 
sometimes prone to do.169 For these four reasons, the United States is not 
here encouraged to go forward alone. 
B. Private Enforcement in Courts of Other Nations  
More effectively, international law might establish a model law ex-
tending to other national courts the empowerment of private citizen-
relators to sue in the name of their governments those guilty of corrupt 
practices, invoking jurisdiction wherever the offender or its assets might 
be found. Such a law might be established by an amendment to the 
OECD Convention on Civil Consequences requiring similar amendments 
to national laws.170 
Such an international law might also explicitly empower a party who 
has paid a bribe under duress to recover the sum paid to its corrupt offi-
cial. This might have the benign effect of making public officials less 
eager to receive bribes. A relevant example of frustration in the private 
enforcement of the present international law deterring corruption is the 
2006 decision of an arbitration panel denying compensation to Nasir Ali 
for a clear breach of contract by the government of Kenya.171 Nasir Ali 
had bribed the President of Kenya to acquire a place of business at the 
Nairobi airport for his duty-free shop. But under a successor President, 
the Republic revoked the contract and leased the space to a rival foreign 
owner. The arbitrators declined to enforce the corrupt contract of Nasir 
                                                                                                                      
and Conditions of Formal Validity for the Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements, 53 
Duke L.J. 1179, 1179–80 (2004). 
 168. E.g., Planche v. Fletcher, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165 (K.B. 1779); Her Majesty 
the Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1979). But cf. Pasquantino v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 349, 352–53 (2005) (holding that a plot to defraud a foreign government of 
tax revenue did violate the Federal Wire Fraud Statute). 
 169. Ralf Michaels, US-Gerichte als Weltgerichte—Avantgarde der Globalisierung [US 
Courts as World Courts: The Avant–Garde of Globalization], 31 Zeitschrift der Deutsch–
Amerikanischen Juristen-Vereinigung [DAJV–Newsletter] 46 (2006) (F.R.G.). 
 170. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 171. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Arb. 00/7 (Oct. 4, 1996), avail-
able at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf. For commentary on the 
responsibility of investment arbitrators to afford civil remedies for bribery, see Abiola O. 
Makinwa, Civil Remedies for International Corruption: The Role of International Arbitration, 
in The Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, supra note 111, at 257–80. 
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Ali and merely expressed frustration that the President who received the 
bribe was permitted to keep it. Nothing indicated that the successor 
business had not also paid a similar bribe to the president’s successor in 
order to secure the repudiation of the contract with Nasir Ali.  
If the OECD or the Civil Law Convention were modified to include 
an endorsement of such laws generously rewarding citizen-plaintiffs for 
representing their governments in matters of transnational corruption, 
there would remain the problem that most national courts who would be 
asked to hear such claims are less hospitable to plaintiffs bringing such 
civil tort cases. And perhaps many would be especially unreceptive to 
foreign claimants invoking international or foreign tort law against a 
domestic defendant. 
It is certain that the numerous features of American law facilitating 
private enforcement would in most national courts be unavailable. Few 
nations’ courts adhere to “the American rule” that a plaintiff who ad-
vances a tort claim but loses is not liable for the defendant’s expenses, 
including attorneys’ fees.172 While there are variations on laws governing 
attorneys’ fees, plaintiffs in most national legal systems would not be 
likely to be permitted to retain counsel for a fee contingent upon his or 
her success in the case.173 And while European courts often conduct 
penetrating factual inquiries, private plaintiffs are rarely empowered to 
conduct private investigations of the sort permitted by the discovery 
rules in use in American courts.174 It is also doubtful that a plaintiff in 
most nations’ courts would have access to government records of the sort 
opened to plaintiffs by “Freedom of Information” or state “sunshine” 
legislation in the United States. Furthermore, few judges are empowered 
to issue injunctions enforceable by fines or imprisonment for those who 
fail to produce needed information or documents. Such limits on private 
access to evidence increase the risk to the relator of a costly defeat of the 
claim. 
                                                                                                                      
 172. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A 
Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651 (1982) (explaining the legal-theoretical bases for “the 
American rule” and pointing out its rarity in the legal systems of the world). 
 173. Conditional fees are allowed in the United Kingdom and in the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights, but these are modest in amount and limited to personal injury or 
insolvency cases. See Michael Zander, Where Are We Now on Conditional Fees?—Or Why 
This Emperor is Wearing Few, If Any, Clothes, 65 Mod. L. Rev. 919 (2002); Winand Emons & 
Nuno Garoupa, US–Style Contingent Fees and UK–Style Conditional Fees: Agency Problems 
and the Supply of Legal Services, 27 Managerial & Decision Econ. 379 (2006).  
 174. See Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 61, 74–76 (2003). 
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VII. Rewarding Private Enforcement 
in International Arbitration 
Given the difficulties of adapting many national courts to the role of 
enforcing the rights of a foreign state at the behest of one or more of its 
citizens, attention ought be given to the possibility of an international 
tribunal commanding the respect and acceptance of all the governments 
willing to subscribe to the principle that citizens are entitled to protect 
their governments from bribes paid by foreign firms. Such an interna-
tional tribunal might also hear claims by firms presenting evidence that 
they could and would have provided goods and services of equal quality 
at lower prices than those a state agreed to pay in response to a defen-
dant’s corrupt practices.175 
Special dispute-resolving schemes have been incorporated in nu-
merous multilateral agreements,176 including some bearing on 
environmental controversies.177 Such a forum could be established and 
empowered with the usable features of the American practice empower-
ing private law enforcement by relators and whistleblowers. There is an 
existing model for an international forum in which corruption claims 
might be heard and decided. 
The model is the International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous international institution 
established by the World Bank under the 1965 Convention on the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States.178 ICSID provides an arbitral forum whose jurisdiction is con-
ferred by the contracts made between member governments and the 
foreign firms with whom they deal. The Nairobi airport case mentioned 
above was decided by an ICSID panel. 
                                                                                                                      
 175. Such a forum might also be a suitable venue to hear tort claims arising from envi-
ronmental harms caused by careless mineral extractions. See supra note 5.  
 176. See Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self–Binding vs. Other–
Binding Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37 (2008). 
 177. See generally Cesare P.R. Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of Interna-
tional Environmental Disputes: A Pragmatic Approach (2000) (analyzing the 
conditions under which international adjudication can effectively tackle the challenge of envi-
ronmental disputes). 
 178. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1966). For the origins of 
the Convention, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 78–125 
(2010); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and 
Interpretation 19–74 (2010); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and 
Transformation, 38 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 47 (2009). For speculation on the future of the 
institution, see International Investment Law in the 21st Century (C. Binder et al. 
eds., 2009); The Future of Investment Arbitration (C. Rogers & R. Alford eds., 2009). 
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There are 144 member states that have ratified the ICSID Conven-
tion and are thus subject to the Center’s jurisdiction. Presently, there are 
over 120 cases pending on its docket; all involve disputes between firms 
engaged in international trade and the member governments with whom 
they have made contracts.179 While, as with other tribunals, one may be 
concerned about the independence of the judges,180 the Center’s mone-
tary awards are enforceable under the 1958 Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards181 that has been 
ratified by all but a very few nations.182 Thus, its decisions are much 
more widely enforceable than mere civil judgments rendered by national 
courts. 
Given the absence of alternatives and the widely recognized utility 
of arbitral tribunals in resolving civil disputes arising in international 
trade, the ICSID model is not only the best available, but one worthy of a 
measure of public confidence.183 Cautions have been expressed such as 
that uttered by Cesare P. R. Romano that while arbitration “has some 
merits, it is by and large a vestige of an old world where adjudication 
was ultimately regarded as a sort of ‘continuation of diplomacy by judi-
cial means,’ to paraphrase a famous quote from Carl von Clausewitz.”184 
But ICSID is more than that as a forum in which pre-existing law is re-
spected and enforced. 
                                                                                                                      
 179. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, http:// 
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (for list of member states, follow “Member States” 
hyperlink; for pending cases, follow “Cases” hyperlink, then follow “List of Cases” hyperlink, 
then follow “Pending Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). 
 180. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribu-
nals, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2005). 
 181. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York 
Convention] (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08 (2000)) (entered into force for the 
U.S. Dec. 29, 1970). 
 182. No nation engaged in substantial trade has failed to ratify the New York Conven-
tion. See Status of the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
NYConvention_status.html (listing the status of each state party to the New York Convention). 
On enforcement, see generally United Nations, Enforcing Arbitration Awards 
Under the New York Convention: Experience and Prospects (1999), http:// 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf (discussing the effec-
tiveness of enforcement, application of the Convention by the judiciary, and potential 
improvements to the implementation process). 
 183. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Diplomacy, Arbitration, and International Courts, in The 
Role of International Courts 51 (Carl Baudenbacher & Erhard Busek eds., 2008) (ex-
plaining the advantages of international adjudication relative to arbitration and diplomacy); 
Robert H. Smith & Tyler B. Robinson, E-Disclosure in International Arbitration, 24 Arb. 
Intl 105 (2008) (commenting on the availability of discovery in traditional international 
commercial arbitration). 
 184. Cesare P.R. Romano, International Dispute Settlement, in The Oxford Handbook 
of International Environmental Law 1036, 1038 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
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It must be conceded that ICSID is not universally revered. The Re-
public of Ecuador, although presently engaged in an ICSID arbitration 
proceeding with Occidental Petroleum arising from the government’s 
response to alleged environmental harms resulting from its extractions in 
Oriente Province, has now withdrawn its consent to future proceedings 
of this sort.185 But if Ecuador seeks future investments in similar enter-
prises by transnational firms, it will likely find it necessary to submit to a 
jurisdiction such as that of ICSID, or a different but similar center estab-
lished by the World Bank.186 And a defendant nation such as Ecuador 
might escape liability by demonstrating that the plaintiff investor was 
guilty of bribing its officials.187 
If the World Bank were to more aggressively pursue its policy deter-
ring corruption in response to the OECD’s initiative, it might establish an 
international arbitral tribunal empowered by contract to resolve corruption 
claims brought by suitably qualified citizens or non-governmental organi-
zations against firms or offices engaged in corrupt practices. Nations 
becoming members of a center such as ICSID could be required to include 
submission to the center’s jurisdiction as a condition of any contract of 
size made with a foreign national or a transnational firm or its subsidiary 
for their purchase of goods or services, their sale of business opportunities, 
or their consent to extractions of minerals. A similar condition of submis-
sion to the Center’s jurisdiction could be imposed on those holding high 
public offices in a signatory state. Such a reform might be made in pursuit 
of the Bank’s broader policy of advancing the rule of law.188 
As an additional condition of the submission of corruption claims 
to such an arbitral tribunal, a member state would need to establish rea-
sonable accounting standards to be observed by its public officials and 
                                                                                                                      
 185. On December 23, 2007, Ecuador withdrew its consent to jurisdiction over matters 
“relative to the extraction of natural resources such as oil, gas, or other minerals.” Letter from 
Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, Ecuadorian Ambassador to the U.S., to Ana Palacio, 
Sec’y Gen., ICSID (Nov. 23, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&Announce
mentType=regular&AnnounceNo=9.pdf.  
 186. It is not unimaginable that such a forum could be empowered to resolve tort claims 
for environmental harms caused by firms engaged in transnational mineral extractions. On the 
shortcomings of traditional legal solutions in the context of environmental law, see Elisa 
Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law 25–62 
(2009). For a brief account of other presently existing transnational forums and the problem of 
occasionally overlapping jurisdictions, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public 
International Law: Why Competition Among International Economic Law Tribunals Is Not 
Working, 59 Hastings L.J. 241 (2007). 
 187. Cf. Inceyna Vallisoletana SI v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/26 (Aug. 2, 2006). 
 188. Julio Faundez, Rule of Law or Washington Consensus: The Evolution of the World 
Bank’s Approach to Legal and Judicial Reform, in Law in the Pursuit of Development, 
supra note 119, at 180–201. 
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by those international firms with whom they might deal. And, as a 
constraint on the misuse of the investigative power conferred on the 
party alleging a corruption claim and his or her counsel, it would be 
appropriate to require him or her at the outset to identify a personal 
source of information suggesting the likelihood of a corrupt practice 
worthy of further investigation. 
To facilitate effective private law enforcement of international anti-
corruption laws in such a center, the civil procedure employed would 
need to differ from that conventionally employed in the arbitration of 
contract disputes, or by the present ICSID arbitral panels. The American 
rules of procedure empowering private investigation surely need not be 
explicitly incorporated, but they serve to illustrate what would be needed 
to empower private counsel to investigate and reveal corruption.189 
Thus, it would be necessary to include provisions empowering the 
parties’ private counsel to expose pertinent records of the government 
and its contracting parties, to examine witnesses under compulsion to 
give evidence, and to empower the arbitral panel to render an enforce-
able monetary award against a firm or person within the represented 
state’s jurisdiction who failed to cooperate reasonably with the investiga-
tion conducted by counsel for any of the parties.190 Official files and 
records of represented states would be subject to arbitral scrutiny.191  
An obvious problem in establishing such a center is the identifica-
tion of suitable members of the arbitration panels.192 Finding suitably 
disinterested decisionmakers is not easy and perfection cannot be 
achieved. But the peer review system employed by OECD to encourage 
                                                                                                                      
 189. See Tom Barnett, A U.S. Perspective: Convergence of Standards for Information 
Exchange in International Arbitration and American Civil Discovery, in Electronic Disclo-
sure in International Arbitration 119 (David J. Howell ed., 2008); but see Michael E. 
Schneider, A Civil Law Perspective: “Forget E-Discovery!” in Electronic Disclosure in 
International Arbitration, id. at 13 (expressing misgivings about the consequences of 
electronic information storage and recovery by investigating parties). 
 190. U.N. Comm’n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor & U.N. Dev. Programme, 
Making the Law Work for Everyone 64 (2008) concludes that: 
In general, the success of alternative dispute resolution depends on certain stan-
dards and practices, such as the right of poor people to appoint judges of their 
choice for the dispute resolution. But it is equally imperative that the alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms are recognized as legitimate and linked to formal 
enforcement, and that they do not operate totally outside the realm of the legal sys-
tem. 
 191. On current discourse regarding procedural rules in international commercial arbitra-
tion, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are Cross-Cultural Ethics Standards Possible or Desirable 
in International Arbitration?, in Melanges en l’Honneur de Pierrie Tercier 883 (Peter 
Gauch et al. eds., 2008). 
 192. See Audley Sheppard, Arbitrator Independence in ICSID Arbitration, in Interna-
tional Investment Law for the 21st Century, supra note 178, at 131–56.  
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enforcement of laws enacted pursuant to its Convention suggests a place 
to begin the search.193 Perhaps a variation on that system might assure a 
heightened sense of public duty and accountability on the part of the ar-
bitrators asked to decide corruption cases. 
The problem of the enforceability of judgments would be substan-
tially diminished when the decision to reward the relator is rendered as 
an arbitral award. The present Convention on Foreign Awards does vest 
discretion in any enforcing court to refuse enforcement of arbitral 
awards offending its notions of local public policy.194 It is clear that this 
provision is intended to be read narrowly, and at least in the United 
States it is.195 But an award might be denied enforcement by a court per-
suaded that the arbitral panel was itself corrupt or unqualified. 
Conclusion 
The World Bank, at least with the support of the International 
Chamber of Commerce or the United Nations, could create a legal forum 
in the ICSID model that could enable and reward effective private en-
forcement of international anticorruption law. The complexities of the 
tasks are at least partially revealed above. But the needs clearly exist and 
the time has come for serious consideration of the limited possibilities. 
Others have noted the difficulty as well as the need for transnational in-
stitutions that might gain the requisite measure of trust from the 
humanity whom they presume to govern.196 If such a legal forum were 
created, it would need some of the features that cause plaintiffs “like 
moths to the light” to be attracted to American courts. These might in-
clude a right of audience for contingent fee lawyers representing private 
citizens or non-governmental organizations empowered to compel wit-
ness testimony and disclosures and to examine public and private files. 
Such a means of private enforcement in an international forum would 
not cure the infectious disease of corruption, but it would almost surely 
reduce the suffering.  
                                                                                                                      
 193. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 194. New York Convention, supra note 181, art. V(2)(b). 
 195. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du 
Papier (Ratka), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Europcar Italia, S.P.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 
156 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 196. See Robert A. Dahl, On Political Equality 87–92 (2006). 
